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REGULATION OF RESEARCH ON THE DECISIONALLY
IMPAIRED: HISTORY AND GAPS IN THE CURRENT
REGULATORY SYSTEM
JONATHAN D. MORENO, PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am honored to have been invited to write the lead article in the
inaugural volume of the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy. This vol-
ume and the conference which inspired it mark critical events in the
public conversation about the use of those who are decisionally im-
paired in research.
The term "decisionally impaired" poses a recurring definitional
problem. All of us are going to be decisionally impaired at one time
or another. The causes could be many: immaturity, disease, the sec-
ondary effects of medication, or disorienting life events, among
others. This paper will focus on that kind of decisional impairment
that is chronic rather than acute, and is pathological rather than asso-
ciated with "normal" youth or aging. I readily grant that there can be
exceptions to this generalization, but it may help us avoid entering
into related but distinct issues and populations, such as decision-mak-
ing for those in the emergency setting (usually an acute and not
* Emily Davie and Joseph S. Kornfeld Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Director of
the Center for Biomedical Ethics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va. (July 1998);
formerly Professor of Pediatrics and of Medicine, SUNY Health Science Center at Brook-
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chronic decisional deficit), or for those who are very young (usually
normal and not pathological).
With this rough delimiting framework as a guide, I will attempt to
develop an outline of the history and ethics of research regulation
with this heterogeneous population. In developing this outline, I en-
countered an unhappy fact about the scholarship in this area that the
present paper is intended to help ameliorate. There is, so far as I can
tell, no authoritative history of the use of persons who are decisionally
impaired in biomedical and behavioral research, nor is this popula-
tion commonly identified in the historical literature as distinctly at
risk for involvement in a study. This scholarly neglect now shows signs
of abating, as does the neglect of this population in the policy arena.
Personal Orientation to Human Subjects Research
While readers with an interest in this topic may be aware of my
work on the history and ethics of research with human subjects, they
may not realize that my interest in research with those who are deci-
sionally impaired began when I was about 10 years old.' My father,
J.L. Moreno, was a distinguished psychiatrist who pioneered the fields
of group psychotherapy, psychodrama, sociometry, and role playing.2
I grew up on the banks of the Hudson River in Beacon, New York, on
a 20 acre tract that included a small psychiatric hospital, which my
father modeled on the European sanitariums he knew as a medical
student in Vienna. My home was about 80 yards from the hospital.
Although my parents tried to keep me an appropriate distance from
the patients, my earliest friends included persons with schizophrenia,
manic-depression, drug addictions, senile dementia, and other neuro-
logical disorders.
One day in 1962 a busload of young people arrived on the
grounds. They were patients at a local state hospital who were to par-
ticipate in a special therapy weekend at the Moreno Sanitarium. I
remember organizing a softball game after they got settled, and one
1. See generally Jonathan D. Moreno, Reassessing the Influence of the Nuremberg Code in
American Medical Ethics, 13J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'v 347 (1997); Ruth Faden et.al.,
US. Medical Researchers, the Nuremberg Doctors Tial and the Nurembeig Code: A Review of the
Findings of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, 276 JAMA 1667 (1996);
Jonathan D. Moreno, Ethical Considerations of Industiy-Sponsored Research: The Use of Human
Subjects, 15J. AM. COLL. NutR. 35s (1996);Jonathan D. Moreno & Susan Lederer, Revising
the History of Cold War Research Ethics, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHCS J. 223 (1996); Jonathan D.
Moreno, The Only Feasible Means: The Pentagon's Ambivalent Relationship with the Nurembeig
Code, 26 HASTINGS CENrER REP. 11 (1996).
2. See generally REN- F. MARINEAU, JACOB LEVY MORENO 1889-1974: FATHER OF
PSYCODRAMA, SOCIOMETRY, AND GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY (Dr. Malcolm Pine ed., 1989).
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young man remarked that the place seemed pretty good. "Yeah," an-
other fellow replied, "but once they start giving you the stuff, it'll be
just like anywhere else." The remark stuck with me, perhaps because I
was a little hurt by it, but also because I wondered what "the stuff' was,
especially that weekend. My father did not work much with drugs; he
was too old-fashioned to accept wholeheartedly the pharmacologic
revolution in psychiatry.
Later I learned that "the stuff' in question that weekend was an
hallucinogen that later became a symbol of an era, but was unknown
to most people at the time. It was lysergic acid diethylamide, LSD-25.
The goal was to examine its effect as an adjunct to group psychother-
apy. Evidently the results were disappointing. According to my
mother, a well-known therapist who also worked with the patients that
weekend, it was too hard to tell where the drug left off and the person-
ality began. Neither of my parents took the drug themselves. My fa-
ther's former Harvard colleague, then Hudson Valley neighbor,
Timothy Leary, later proved a more willing guide to the psychedelic
world to come.
That weekend on the Hudson I witnessed a gathering for thera-
peutic research. I have since wondered whether any consent process
was involved when the patients were recruited for the LSD-cum-psy-
chotherapy weekend, but since these were state hospital patients in
1962 and a benefit was intended, a consent process worthy of the
name seems unlikely. I do know that my father was aware of and trou-
bled by these issues. His compassion for his patients, with whom he
identified far more than with his professional colleagues, contributed
to his reputation as a maverick. In the memoirs he completed shortly
before his death in 1974, he recalled his work as a second year medi-
cal student in the clinic of Julius Wagner von Jauregg, an important
figure in the history of psychiatric research. The year was probably
1915, and the place was Vienna, Austria, but the culture of academic
medicine sounds familiar:
There was no salary for being a research assistant at the
clinic, just a tremendous amount of prestige in being there, a
wonderful opportunity to meet and to work with some of the
top psychiatrists, both research and clinical, in the world,
and, in my case, to have my name on publications, still an
important factor in a young scientist's career. I was involved
in a few other research projects there, but the only one I
remember is a study of iodine metabolism. We went to the
Tyrol and injected rats full of iodine . . . .After experi-
menting on rats, we experimented on inmates at the psychi-
1998]
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atric hospital connected with the Von Jauregg clinic,
Steinhoff hospital.
I have always been appalled at the idea of experimenting on
helpless mental patients. I remember projects - I was not
involved with them - in which patients were injected with
TB bacilli and another in which injections of alcohol were
administered.3
Shortly after the incidents my father recalled, in his graduation
year 1917, his mentor Wagner von Jauregg experimented with the in-
duction of fevers as a cure for general paresis, a condition that occurs
during the tertiary phase of syphilis and can cause insanity, paralysis,
and death.4 He injected nine paralyzed patients with malaria, which
was subsequently cured with quinine.' The malaria-induced fevers
were claimed to cure a large percentage of the patients.6 For his dis-
covery, Wagner von Jauregg was awarded the Nobel Prize for
Medicine or Physiology in 1927, and malaria therapy for general pare-
sis has since been superseded by penicillin therapy.7
Important as it was, Wagner von Jauregg's work was clouded by
his questionable use of mentally ill patients as research subjects, a
practice which was apparently common in Austrian psychiatry and
neurology at the time. Interestingly, Wagner von Jauregg himself was
an ardent campaigner for laws to protect the insane from persecution
and discrimination.8 Physicians in that part of the world must have
been well aware of problems in research ethics. In 1892, a Prussian
medical school professor had given blood serum from people with
syphilis to four children and three young prostitutes.9 Dr. Albert Neis-
ser worked on a syphilis vaccine, but failed to ask the permission of
those he infected or their legal guardians."° When several contracted
the disease, newspapers carried banner headlines about the scandal.'"
3. J. L. Moreno, The Autobiography ofJ. L. Moreno, M.D. 5-7, 8 (1974) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (an abridged version was published in 42J. GRoup PsY-
CHOTHERAPY, PSYCHODRAMA & SOCIOMETRY 59 (1987)).
4. SeeJulius Wilson von Jauregg, NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS: AN H.W. WILSON BIOGRAPHI-
CAL DIcrIONARY 1092, 1093 (Tyler Wasson ed., The H.W. Wilson Co., 1987).
5. See id. at 1093.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, THE NAZI DocroRs
AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 121, 127 (GeorgeJ. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 128.
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In 1900, the Prussian government directed that medical research must
have the human subject's consent.' 2
II. RESEARCH WITH SICK PATIENTS
Historically, experiments with sick patients afflicted with the dis-
ease being studied have not been perceived as bound by the same
ethical constraints as research with healthy, "normal" subjects. This
long-standing perception has also been examined in another context
by the Federal Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experi-
ments, which reported to President Clinton in October 1995 on gov-
ernment-sponsored studies of ionizing radiation.13  If this
reconstruction of an historical assumption is correct (an assumption
of which people may not of course have been aware at the time), it
may help to explain why certain very public experimental uses of the
decisionally impaired rarely provoked a general outrage: They were
assumed to fall within the then-privileged domain of doctor-patient
relationships.
The only other Nobelist in psychiatry, Portuguese physician Egas
Moniz, who won in 1949 for Physiology or Medicine, also engaged in
experiments with sick patients. 14 "American physiologists had experi-
mented with monkeys by surgically removing their prefrontal lobes."15
As a result, the monkeys no longer became upset when they made
mistakes carrying out complex tasks they had learned; they seemed to
be immune to anxiety and frustration. 6 Moniz theorized that the
same may be true for severely anxious or aggressive mental patients.' 7
The operation did seem to cure at least some of the first twenty on
whom it was tried."8 Moniz was forced to supervise the performance
of more than 100 "leucotomies" (later called lobotomies) because he
was too impaired by gout in his hands to perform the procedure him-
self.'9 The technique was eventually banned by the Portugese govern-
12. See id. at 127.
13. Id..
14. See Biography of Egas Moniz, NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS 722, 723-24. (Tyler Wasson ed.,
1987).
15. Id. at 723.
16. See id
17. See id.
18. See id. at 724 (noting that of the first twenty operations, seven of the patients were
considered cured, eight improved, and five were unchanged).
19. Id. (explaining that Moniz dubbed the procedure a "leucotomy," from the Greek
word for white, because of the white matter connecting the prefrontal lobes to other parts
of the brain that were surgically removed),
1998]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
ment, but others adopted and widely used lobotomy procedures,
especially in the United States.2"
Several more innovative somatic therapies were introduced into
psychiatry in the 1930s. "Shock therapy" involves electrical impulses
or drugs, such as insulin, to induce hypoglycemia, or metrazol to in-
duce convulsions. Contemporary psychiatrists were discomfited by
the rush of these new and unproven drastic interventions. As histo-
rian Gerald Grob stated, physicians asked whether they should "de
ploy experimental therapies on patients whose illness often impaired
their mental faculties?"2 Finally, the pressure to find an effective
treatment for the large number of chronic mental patients crowding
hospitals in this era of institutionalization overwhelmed such abstract
questions. In Grob's words, "[i]f there was even a remote chance that
an experimental therapy would aid them, should they be deprived of
its use until more conclusive evidence was available?"22 In the history
of research ethics, this argument is a familiar, and to some degree,
compelling rationale.
The iconic status of the Nobel Prize serves to highlight the com-
plex ethical issues at the heart of the only two Nobels given in psychia-
try.2" But the centrality of these issues in our cultural history extends
well beyond these. examples. They are embedded in the development
of modern, liberal democratic society itself, and in the context of pub-
lic policy toward the mentally ill. One of the signal events of the
French Revolution was the freeing of the inmates of the asylum of
Salpetriere by Philippe Pinel who believed, consistent with the revolu-
tionary philosophy, that insanity would be cured by the establishment
of a new civil society.24 Some trace to this incident the beginning of
the moral treatment movement that dominated the care of the men-
tally ill for a hundred years, evolving finally into the mental hygiene
movement of the early twentieth century.2 5 Alexis de Tocqueville,
one of the most renowned commentators on the American scene, ar-
rived specifically to report on the way the new country was managing
its most marginal citizens in new asylums.2 1 Moral treatment institu-
tions were carefully designed to provide "lunatics" with the social and
20. See id.
21. GERALD GROB, THE MAD AMONG Us 181 (1994).
22. Id.
23. I am indebted to my SUNY colleague, Dinko Podrug, M.D., for this point.
24. SeeJonathan D. Moreno, The Continuity of Madness: Pragmatic Naturalism and Mental
Health in America, in CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
645-46 (Arthur Caplan et al. eds., 1981).
25. See id.
26. See id at 645.
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physical orderliness that might imprint itself on their disordered
brains. 7 The moral treatment movement was a grand and well-mean-
ing, albeit unsystematic, social experiment with the seemingly recalci-
trant problem of mental illness.28
Other innovations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
more closely resembled therapeutic research because. they were di-
rected specifically toward mentally ill patients.29 Some of these tech-
niques were practiced in moral treatment institutions in spite of their
apparent philosophical inconsistency." Bloodletting, purging with
emetics, and shock therapy all had their day;3" had controlled re-
search methods been available, that day would probably have been
shorter in every case. When the resources of the new biologically-
based medicine combined with randomized controlled trials, a power-
ful new weapon was theoretically available to psychiatry and neurology
as to other disciplines. But until the mid-twentieth century, there re-
mained a frustrating lack of potential drug therapies. Controlled
studies of cognitively and socially-oriented interventions, like psychoa-
nalysis and, psychotherapy, are notoriously difficult to perform with
reliability because of the countless variables that affect these
processes.
Finally, in the early 1950s, there was hope for the long sought
medical treatment of mental disorders. A class of tranquilizers gained
notoriety for ameliorating the symptoms of schizophrenia. 2 But
here, too, the human research issue casts a shadow. The neuroleptic
drugs unquestionably inaugurated a new era in the treatment of the
mentally ill, and by the mid-1970s the de-institutionalization policy
they helped justify was well-established. Unfortunately, the new
"psychoactive" medications also had serious side-effects with long-term
use, a fact that was recognized by the 1960s." Some commentators
charged that the drug company that marketed Thorazine, the first of
these medications, conducted hasty clinical trials in its rush to bring
the potentially lucrative new product to market.34 These charges fol-
lowed the thalidomide tragedy that resulted in the subsequent expan-
27. See id. at 649.
28. Similar charges have been lodged against a more recent policy response to mental
illness, that is, de-institutionalization. Like moral treatment, de-institutionalization was a
large-scale social experiment which did not meet the statutory definition of research.
29. See Moreno, supra note 24, at 650.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 648.
32. See, e.g., PHIL BROWN, TRANSFER OF CARE 150-51 (1985).
33. See id.
34. See id.
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sion of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) authority, to
include efficacy as well as toxicity in approving the sale of drugs.3 5 In
the case of Thorazine, like thalidomide, the problem was not con-
ducting overly aggressive clinical research, but just the opposite
(though thalidomide's teratogenicity was so statistically infrequent
that only a massive, large-scale study would have uncovered it). The
alleged result was the wide prescription of a psychiatric medication
whose long-term effects were not well understood, and which justified
a drastically altered social policy, and in effect ignited another social
experiment, directed at the perennial problem of mental illness.
III. THE DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED AND NON-THERAPEUTIC RESEARCH
Not all instances of ethically questionable research practices in-
volving those who are decisionally impaired are intended to benefit
the subjects, nor are they intended to yield knowledge of the sources
of the impairment that affect the subject population. Rather, they
may have an entirely unrelated purpose, such as determining the ef-
fects of an agent on the human body, or the body's effect on the
agent. In these cases the decisionally impaired subject is chosen for
research because he or she is readily available, especially if the subject
is institutionalized. Two prominent illustrations of this scenario oc-
curred during the 1950s, though they were generally known only
much later.
In 1952, Harold Blauer was 42 years old and a jet-setting tennis
pro at Manhattan's Hudson River Club.36 Sometime that summer
Blauer divorced from his wife and became, in the fall, a patient of
Bellevue Hospital. 7 He was diagnosed with clinical depression and
was admitted voluntarily to the New York State Psychiatric Institute
(NYPI). 38 Blauer was not aware that the NYPI had a secret contract
with the Army Chemical Corps to conduct research using a mescaline
derivative.3 9 In mid-January of 1953, Blauer was given a number of
injections with widely varying doses, of which the last one was signifi-
cantly larger than the first.4" Blauer went into convulsions and died
35. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1997).
36. See Barrett v. U.S., 660 F.Supp. 1291, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
37. See id. at 1298, 1317.
38. See id. at 1298.
39. See id. at 1299. (Blauer was aware that the drugs he was given were "experimental"
in the sense that they did not come off the shelf from a pharmacy; however, the primary
purpose of the experiment was to gather data that the Chemical Corps required for its
investigation of the mescaline derivatives as potential chemical warfare agents).
40. See i& at 1296, 1299-1300.
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hours later.4 The Army and New York State arranged a cover-up of
the actual circumstances of Blauer's death and split an $18,00042 pay-
ment between his widow and two young children. Twenty years later,
in 1975, the Secretary of the Army contacted Blauer's daughters about
a press release identifying the Army's involvement in their father's
death.43 Finally, in 1987, a court awarded Blauer's daughters
$702,044 in compensation from the federal government.44
At around the same time that the Blauer case began in the early
1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was helping to support
studies that would demonstrate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.4 5
In one such episode that came fully to light only a few years ago, the
AEC co-sponsored with the Quaker Oats company a study of mineral
intake in the human body, using as a tracer minute amounts of radia-
tion in breakfast cereal.46 Research subjects included emotionally dis-
turbed adolescent boys in Massachusetts institutions known as Fernald
and Wrenthem.47 At Fernald, about which more is known than
Wrenthem, parents were asked to consent for their boys' participation
in a special program called the "science club."4 They were not told
the true purpose of the club, nor that they would be ingesting tiny
amounts of radiation.49 In its 1995 Final Report to the President, the
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments found that
government officials and biomedical professionals even at that time
"should have recognized that when research offers no prospect of medi-
cal benefit, whether subjects are healthy or sick, research should not
proceed without the person's consent."50
Both the Blauer and Fernald-Wrenthem cases involved decision-
ally impaired subjects. The experiments were neither intended to
benefit the subjects nor intended to address the conditions that
caused their impairments. Interestingly, both were also projects that
were at least partly sponsored by national security agencies, a sector of
government that used mental patients in research during the Second
41. See id. at 1300.
42. See id. at 1305-06. The court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law that
stated that Blauer had died as a result of New York State's negligence. Id. at 1306.
43. See id. at 1306. Blauer's eldest daughter filed an administrative claim with the De-
partment of the Army for wrongful death of her father. Id. She filed action in federal
court in 1976. Id.
44. See id. at 1323.
45. See Grodin, supra note 9, at 172.
46. See id. at 196.
47. See id. at 210.
48. See id,
49. See id,
50. See id. at 504 (emphasis in original).
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World War.51 The vast majority of wartime subjects were military per-
sonnel (mainly in mustard gas studies), conscientious objectors, or
prisoners. 52 Psychotic patients were used in a malaria study, and re-
tarded subjects participated in dysentery vaccine experiments spon-
sored by the Committee on Medical Research, an arm of the
Executive Office of the President.5"
Within the pantheon of more commonly-cited research ethics
scandals, there is one that also falls into the category of research with
the decisionally impaired that is neither intended to benefit them di-
rectly nor to contribute to knowledge about the condition that has
caused their decisional impairment. In the infamous Brooklyn Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital case in 1963, debilitated patients were in-
jected with live cancer cells, apparently without their knowledge.54
The study's purpose was to gather information on how the systems of
patients with non-cancerous chronic conditions would respond to the
presence of transplanted cells." The investigators claimed to have ob-
tained verbal consent, of some sort, from the subjects, and defended
the lack of documentation on the grounds that more dangerous pro-
cedures were performed than this one without consent forms, and
they did not want to frighten the patients.5" When complaints were
filed, state regulatory agencies responded with unusual vigor, and the
principle investigator was censured by the New York State Board of
Regents, which at that time was responsible for physician certification
in the state.57
IV. HisToiuc REGULATORY EFFORTS
Most efforts to regulate the use of human subjects have been
stimulated by concerns for children in research, likewise, but to a
lesser extent for pregnant women and fetuses, and later, prisoners.
Nonetheless, prior to the 1970s there were some widely scattered at-
tempts to apply guidelines to the experimental use of the decisionally
impaired. One of these occurred in Weimar, Germany. In 1930, a
Jewish doctor named Julius Moses reported that 75 children had died
in Lubeck as a result of pediatricians' experiments with a tuberculosis
51. See DAVID H. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 30 (1991).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 34-36.
54. See RUTH R. FADEN & THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 161 (1986).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. SeeJAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 9-65 (1972).
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vaccine.58 The German press was highly critical of the powerful chem-
ical manufacturers for using. hospitals to test their new products.5 9
The scandal in Lubeck gave substance to the accusations that people
were being exploited for potential profits.
It happened that Moses was also a member of the German Parlia-
ment from the Social Democratic Party.' ° In 1931, he played a key
role in pressuring the Interior Ministry to respond to the Lubeck scan-
dal.6 The resulting rules were far more comprehensive and sophisti-
cated than anything introduced by any government until then, and
compare quite favorably with modern regulations.62 They included a
requirement for consent from informed human subjects.63 Like so
much progressive government in the ill-fated Weimar Republic, these
regulations were trampled by Hider's regime, which used tens of
thousands of concentration camp inmates in vicious experiments."
After the war, at the Nuremberg trial of the Nazi doctors in 1947, the
prosecution team alleged the use of the Interior Ministry guidelines as
evidence that these prior standards should have governed the actions
of the Hitler regime in the use of human experimental subjects.6" As
a counter-argument, the legal status of the 1931 guidelines was ques-
tioned because they were not cited by the international organization
which monitored public health laws and regulations in the 1930s and
1940s."o
The team that investigated the Nazi crimes took notice of the
abuse of the mentally ill in the context of the "T4" or "euthanasia"
program6 7 that led to the extermination of many psychiatric patients
and was, in effect, a rehearsal for the mass murders in the concentra-
tion camps. The chief medical advisor to the Nuremberg judges, Leo
Alexander, made the Nuremberg prosecutions possible by unraveling
58. See Grodin, supra note 9, at 129.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 130-31.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 132.
65. See id. at 129.
66. See id.
67. Robert N. Proctor, Nazi Doctors, Racial Medicine, and Human Experimentation, in THE
NAzi DocroRs AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 23-24 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin,
eds., 1992). The euthanasia program was planned and administered by the leaders of the
German medical community after an October 1939 order issued from Hitler. Id at 23.
The order required that certain doctors be commissioned to grant a "mercy death" to
patientsjudged "incurably sick by medical examination." Id. The gassing of the mentally ill
was a rehearsal for the subsequent destruction of other "lives not worth living," (e.g., Jews,
Homosexuals, Communists, Gypsies, and prisoners of war). Id. at 23-24.
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the horrific story of the camp experiments6" from the records of SS
chief Heinrich Himmler. Near the end of the trial, Alexander wrote a
memorandum to the judges, portions of which were incorporated into
the famous Nuremberg Code. 9 His memorandum became a part of
the judges' decision that was their attempt to establish rules to guide
human experimentation.7" He also singled out the mentally ill as a
population that should be given special protections.7 The judges de-
leted this reference in their final draft. A likely explanation is that the
judges did not want to appear to be interfering in legitimate medical
judgments about innovative treatment, but only to rule out non-bene-
ficial and highly risky experiments with easily coerced populations of
healthy subjects such as prisoners. Even so, much confusion about
the judges' intentions has been caused by the Nuremberg Code's cele-
brated first line, that "the voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential,"" a formulation that seems to rule out research
with children, with emergency patients, and with the decisionally
impaired.
When the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the Commission)
was created in 1974, in the wake of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study scan-
dal, the decisionally impaired were not high on the list of special
populations for consideration. The Commission's report on those
"institutionalized as mentally infirm" (IMI) came at the very end of
their tenure in 1978.73 Moreover, in framing the topic in terms of
institutionalized persons, the report seemed to be obsolete. Move-
ments toward de-institutionalization were already well under way in
many states, if not largely completed. The coercive aspects of institu-
tionalization were familiar to the Commission from its lengthy deliber-
ations on prison research, but this circumstance failed to capture the
more subtle issues of study participation for persons who were no
longer likely to be incarcerated in "total institutions."
68. See Grodin, supra note 9, at 139.
69. See Proctor, supra note 67; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF HEALTH AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL RESEARCH, HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH HANDBOOK SECOND EDITION: APPENDIX -
THE NUREMBERG CODE 15-3 to -4 (1993), reprintedfrom 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINAL BEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 191-82
(1949).
70. See Grodin, supra note 9, at 135.
71. See id.
72. See The Nuremberg Code, supra note 69, at 15-3.
73. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVORIAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE
INSTITUTIONAUJZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM (DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 78-0006, 1978).
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On its own terms, the Commission's recommendations called for
evaluating research with each class of IMI, including the mentally ill. 4
The Commission found it advisable, in many instances, to make use of
a disinterested third party to ensure that the research is not harmful.75
This individual might also play the role of a consent auditor, one who
monitors the informed consent process itself and determines whether
the potential subject has given a truly competent consent.76 Tracking
the framework used in its pediatric recommendations, the Commis-
sion also urged that persons with diminished capacity be allowed to
"assent" to research participation, after which their legally authorized
representative must be asked to consent on the subject's behalf.77
There is remarkably little literature on the process that led to the
rejection of the Commission's recommendations on those institution-
alized as mentally infirm in the early 1980s, although they were the
least influential portion of the Commission's legacy. According to
one former Commission member and prominent bioethicist, Al Jon-
sen, officials at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and
the Agency for Drug Addiction and Mental Health Association
(ADAMHA) objected that the recommendations would stifle impor-
tant research with their populations.7" The reaction of the relevant
professional community may perhaps be gauged from a paper pub-
lished by a consultant to the National Commission, Harvard professor
Neil Chayet, who argued in 1976 that the perspectives of law and
medicine on informed consent are "fundamentally incompatible -
particularly in the area of the mentally disabled, where appreciation
of the concept of informed consent is well on its way to paralyzing
research and treatment."79
With the significant exception of the IMI recommendations, the
1981 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) rules
largely followed the Commission's work. In 1991, the rules were codi-
fied for 17 federal agencies that conduct or sponsor research with
human subjects and are now known as the "Common Rule."8" The
regulations authorize institutional review boards (IRBs) to institute
additional safeguards for research involving vulnerable groups, in-
74. See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,328, 11,330 (1978).
75. See id. at 11,332.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 11,332.
78. Interview with AIJonsen, Former Member of the National Commission for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (May 19, 1997).
79. Neil Chayet, Informed Consent of the Mentally Disabled: A Failing Fiction, 6 PsYcHmATRIc
ANNALS 82-89 (1976).
80. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1997).
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cluding the mentally disabled."' The safeguards could involve consul-
tation with specialists concerning the risks and benefits of a procedure
for these populations, or special monitoring of consent processes to
ensure voluntariness."2 But it is not known how frequently IRBs actu-
ally implement such further conditions.
V. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
There is strong indirect evidence that IRBs are unlikely to com-
pensate for the lack of specific regulations for research with the cogni-
tively impaired by aggressive use of their discretionary authority.
Observers of the local review process agree that, if anything, the IRB
workload has greatly increased since the 1981 regulations were first
implemented." IRBs appear to have all they can handle to keep up
with their paperwork, as privately funded research has proliferated.
Monitoring of a protocol's progress by IRBs after approval is practi-
cally non-existent, apart from investigators' routine filing of annual
progress reports."4 After the initial stages, the direct impact on actual
research practices of local review is minimal.8 5
The lack of specific federal guidance on research with the deci-
sionally impaired has also meant that non-federally funded research
has gone its own way, or rather at least 50 different ways. The states
are a crazy quilt of regulation in this area, with most having no rules
that clearly apply to this group while some are quite restrictive.8 6 Re-
cent events in the state of New York illustrate the situation. A state
court has prohibited all state-sponsored greater-than-minimal-risk re-
search with mental patients that does not hold potential benefit to the
subjects.8 7 The decision in T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental
Health, resulting from a suit brought by former patients-subjects and
several advocacy organizations, came with harsh criticism of state prac-
81. See§ 46.109.
82. See § 46.109(e).
83. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. AcCT. OF., REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMIT-
TEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH" CONTINUED VIGILANCE
CRITICAL TO PROTECTING HUMAN SUqJECTs at 17 (U.S. Gen. Acct. Off. 1996).
84. See id. at 10.
85. See id. at 1].
86. Diane Hoffmann and Jack Schwartz, Proxy Consent to Participation of the Decisionally
Impaired in Medical Research - Maryland's Policy Initiative, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'v 136
(1998).
87. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 193-94 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d. (N.Y. 1997); leave to appeal granted by 684
N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997); and appeal dismissed by 1997 WL 785461 (N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997).
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tices, some administrative, some technical, and some constitutional in
nature.88
It would be ironic if the lack of specific federal guidance resulted
in even greater restrictions on research with the decisionally impaired
than the National Commission contemplated. The Commission's rec-
ommendations were virtually silent about what constitutes "benefit" to
the subject, and what little was said about giving notice to subjects or
permitting them to appeal research participation would not have satis-
fied the court in T.D.89
The growing interest in research with the decisionally impaired
stems partly from the most recent well-publicized incident with this
population, the suicide of a former subject in a "drug free" or "wash-
out" study at the University of California, at Los Angeles (UCLA).9"
Commentaries on this case and its implications often omit that the
subject was two years out of the drug free period of the study and one
year out of observation from the study itself.91 Further, the National
Institutes of Health Office for Protection from Research Risks con-
cluded that the study was ethical, but the informed consent form
flawed." Defenders of the research also claim that patients, following
admission to inpatient units, are often taken off all medication to es-
tablish a baseline, but withdrawing psychiatric drugs poses the danger
of relapse and must be carefully managed.9"
Several years after the controversy, how should the UCLA study
be assessed? Often familiar accounts of ethics cases exaggerate the
harms and wrongs done, or the certainty that harms and wrongs were
done. For example, the Willowbrook hepatitis studies, although they
were ethically flawed, were more complicated in their ethical implica-
tions than is often appreciated.94 Similarly, as a former staff member
88. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 184-94.
89. See supra notes 7 77 and accompanying text.
90. See Adil E. Shamoo & TimothyJ. Keay, Ethical Concerns about Relapse Studies, 5 CAM-
BRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHi-Cs 373-86 (1996).
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RIsKs DIVISION OF HUMAN SUBJECT PRO-
TECTION, EVALUATION OF HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH CON-
DUCTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES (1994).
93. See generally Ross]. Baldessarini, Chemotherapy, in HARV. GUIDE To MODERN PSYCHIA-
TRY 387-432 (A. M. Nicolai ed., 1978).
94. See HENRY BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMAN STUDIES 119, 122-27
(1970). The Willowbrook study was "directed toward determining the period of infectivity
of infectious hepatitis. Artificial induction of hepatitis was carried out in an institution for
mentally defective children (many of whom were [five] to [eight] years old) in which a
mild form of hepatitis was endemic. The parents gave consent for the intramuscular injec-
tion or oral administration of the virus, but little is said as to whether they were informed
of the hazards involved." Id. at 123.
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of the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experi-
ments, I have been surprised how often someone tells me how awful a
certain radiation study was, when the Committee had concluded that
the case was far less terrible, or not clearly wrong, as compared to
some others. Nonetheless, the UCLA case does point to some
problems, though not necessarily those that have attracted most of the
attention. For example, how routine are drug holidays? Do studies
that require a drug-free period simply "piggy back" on a common
practice, or could the desire to enroll patients in studies determine
the nature of their care? What merit is there to the theory that there
is a "kindling" effect from repeated symptomatic episodes, so that sub-
sequent psychotic states are exacerbated by previous ones? When
provocation studies are conducted, should the return of symptoms as-
sociated with schizophrenia be evaluated as an inherent harm to be
weighed against the potential for direct benefit to the patient?
It is common place that the evolution of research ethics, and es-
pecially regulatory changes, is driven by scandal. The lack of gui-
dance to IRBs in the current regulations and the flaws and
inconsistencies in state laws would not, perhaps, have come to public
attention had it not been for the T.D. case95 which, if it does not rise
to the level of scandal, has at least been a significant source of embar-
rassment and frustration to the New York psychiatric community. Ac-
cordingly, when President Clinton appointed the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (NBAC) in 1995, he included the review of cur-
rent human subjects regulations in its mandate.96 One population in
which NBAC is especially interested is the decisionally impaired. 7
It remains to be seen how the psychiatric and substance, abuse
treatment communities will react to any new recommendations that
emerge from NBAC. It seems likely that whatever is brought forward
will be perceived as more restrictive than the status quo, in that it will
specify conditions for research with the decisionally impaired. How-
ever, psychiatric research has changed a great deal in the past fifteen
years. Those who conduct pharmacologic and biologic research are
more accustomed to regulation than were those who performed be-
havioral research twenty years ago, and the former are now dominant
in psychiatry.
95. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text,
96. Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063 (1995).
97. See generally Meeting of the National Bioethics Advisory Committee (Oct. 4, 1996)
(unpublished transcript, portions of which on file with the Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy).
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VI. TowARD REGULATORY REFORM
There may be few instances of actual abuse in contemporary re-
search involving those who are decisionally impaired. Unfortunately,
there is no systematic study of this question. What is clear is that
many, but by no means all, advocates for this group believe that more
specific rules are needed. However, they are also loathe to impose
restrictions that would significantly retard medical progress.98 As Al-
exander Capron has recently written, "no type of research raises more
problems than research with the mentally impaired, particularly those
who are institutionalized for treatment."99 Yet, among populations
that are often regarded as "vulnerable" and in need of special protec-
tion, persons who are decisionally impaired stand out as potential sub-
jects for whom no regulations have been tailored.
In general terms, there have been many changes in the medical
research environment since the 1981 enactment of the DHHS regula-
tions ° ° that in 1991 were codified as the "Common Rule" for 17 fed-
eral agencies." Among the most important of these changes are the
increase in multi-site studies and the increasing proportion of pri-
vately funded research. 02 As a result, IRBs are faced with challenges
not contemplated two decades ago.'05 They are often in an awkward
position with regard to changes in consent forms for important and
lucrative multi-site studies, and they are ill-equipped to monitor their
colleagues' potential conflicts of interest in contract research. 0 4 The
increasing workload for IRBs has not been accompanied by increased
resources for their support, and, as presently structured, the OPRR
has little discretion to alter regulatory requirements and encourage a
more activist role for IRBs while relieving them of some paperwork
that could be handled by qualified staff."' Finally, there is growing
Congressional concern about research that does not come under fed-
eral informed consent requirements, either because it is privately
98. See Alexander M. Capron, Incapacitated Research, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25-7
(1997).
99. Id. at 25.
100. See Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,002 (1991).
101. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.404 (1991).
102. See generally U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORrrY MEMBER, COM-
MirrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAiRs, U.S. SENATE, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: CONTINUED VIGI-
LANCE CRITICAL TO PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS, GAO/HEHS Doc. No. 96-72 (1996).
103. See id
104. See id. at 8.
105. See id. at 17, 19.
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funded or because the sponsors do not plan to pursue FDA approval
fov a drug or device."0 6
This litany of general comments about likely areas of continued
discussion applies, of course, to research with those who are decision-
ally impaired as well. But there are a number of more specific items
concerning this population. Each of them could be a discussion in
itself.
First, a lively debate is beginning about the suitability and practi-
cality of advance research directives for those who are able to antici-
pate a substantial period of decisional impairment. These directives
may be procedural (durable powers-of-attorney for health care) or
substantive (specifying what unapproved treatment may be attempted
and under what circumstances), but they may be limited by at least
two factors, current state laws and practicality. 0 7
Second, if advance research directives are found to be ethically
and legally acceptable and practical, it will need to be determined
whether interventions not intended to benefit the patient, or those
bearing more than a minor risk, may be authorized in advance by the
potential subject. As Rebecca Dresser and Peter Whitehouse have re-
cently argued, "determining an acceptable balance of risks and poten-
tial benefits is the most important ethical challenge in emergency and
nonemergency research involving decisionally incapable subjects."' 0 8
Third, the National Commission's earlier suggestion about utiliz-
ing "consent auditors" "°U during the recruitment of decisionally im-
paired potential subjects may have renewed prospects. Not only
would this system provide another layer of accountability with a disin-
terested third party, but if required for certain kinds of research, it
would serve to encourage IRBs to do more active monitoring of con-
sent processes. Consent auditors may also contribute to the education
of investigators and their team members with regard to the conditions
for a valid consent.
Fourth, the medical community is going to have to accept the
need to subject certain popular study designs to greater scrutiny.
"'Washout" studies are a prime example, both because of the direct
106. See HHS Oversight Biomedical Ethics: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources
of the House Comm. On Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong., 1997 WL 10570903,
(statement of David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D., Director, CDC).
107. SeeJason H. T. Karlawish & Greg A. Sachs, Research on the Cognitively Impaired: Lessons
and Warnings from the Emergency Research Debate, 45J. AM. GERIATR. Soc. 474, 475 (1997).
108. Rebecca Dresser & Peter Whitehouse, Emergency Research and Research Involving Sub-
jects with Cognitive Impairment: Ethical Connections and Contrasts, 45J. A. GERiATR. Soc. 521,
522 (1997) (emphasis added).
109. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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harm that is done to subjects by the return of symptoms, and the indi-
rect harm that may be associated with burdensome procedures con-
ducted during the drug-free period, such as the use of neurological
imaging devices that can entail discomfort and distress."' It may still
be possible to conduct such studies by making certain modifications,
such as beginning a trial with the most moderately affected
patients."'
Fifth, notice of entrance into a study, as was mentioned previ-
ously, should be required regardless of capacity with an appeals pro-
cess built into the system.. As the Maryland Working Group has
suggested in its draft legislative proposal, primafacie dissent by the sub-
ject, regardless of capacity, in the future must be clearly identified as
an absolute bar to further participation.12 A related but more diffi-
cult question is whether periodic "re-consenting" should be required
for certain subjects at certain times in the study, including those sub-
jects whose conditions may render them especially compliant due to
dependency.'I.3
Finally, the FDA's "narrow exception" to the informed consent
requirement for emergency research 4 may someday be used to jus-
tify consent waivers for non-emergency research that is hypothesized
to present a very favorable risk-benefit ratio. This movement will be-
gin with those whose decisional impairment is acute and who can be
retrospectively "consented" within hours or perhaps days of the inter-
vention. Attempts will then be made to extend the exception to those
whose decisional impairment is chronic and whose capacity to consent
is a distant possibility. It is not too early to consider whether any sys-
tem can adequately protect subjects from inappropriate applications
110. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Drug-Free Resehrch in Schizophrenia: An Overview of the Contro-
versy, 18 IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1, 3 (1996).
111. See id. at 4.
112. SeeJack Schwartz, Office of Md. Att'y Gen., Second Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Working Group app. at A-9 (May 1997) (the Second Report is reprinted in the ap-
pendix to this issue of the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
113. See Rebecca Dresser, Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues, 276
JAMA 67, 68 (1996).
114. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1997).
Such regulations shall provide that such exemption shall be conditioned upon
the manufacturer, or the sponsor of the investigation, requiring that experts us-
ing such drugs for investigational purposes... that they will inform any human
beings to whom such drugs . . . are being administered . . . that such drugs are
being used for investigational purposes and will obtain the consent of such
human beings or their representatives, except when they deem it not feasible or,
in their professional judgment, contrary to the best interests of such human
beings.
See id.
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of such arrangements, or whether a barrier must be constructed
against further consent waivers.
VII. APOLOGIA
I am a philosopher, not a physician; a critic, not an investigator.
Confined to taking potshots from the sidelines, I will never enjoy
credit for the medical advances that will someday brighten the lives of
those who are decisionally impaired.
For nearly twenty years my father took care of a young man from
a middle-class family in New Jersey, a man I will call Sam. When Sam
arrived at my father's hospital in 1949 he was depressed and with-
drawn. After several years of institutionalization he had improved,
and his family prevailed upon my father to let him go home for a long
weekend. A foolish uncle, thinking that Sam must need some mascu-
line "R&R," took Sam to a prostitute. He was unable to perform, and
returned to the hospital in a profoundly depressed state that
progressed to a psychosis from which he never recovered. For many
years he lived in the bucolic setting of my father's sanitarium, in a
room that was sparsely furnished so that he could not hurt himself. A
man whose robust physique contained a gentle spirit and a painfully
vulnerable person, Sam was cared for meticulously by nurses and at-
tendants. He expressed himself mainly through high-pitched whines
and bleating sounds that I will never forget. My childhood friends,
upon first hearing Sam's ranting while we played on the grounds,
were shocked, then curious, but quickly grew accustomed to the un-
worldly conversations that took place deep within Sam's soul.
Guilt-ridden, my father was determined not to repeat his earlier
mistake and grew fiercely protective of his patient. An old-fashioned
psychiatrist who would surely be characterized as paternalistic by later
bioethicists like me, he feared the abuses to which Sam would be ex-
posed in a state hospital. For several years, there was only one patient
in the old sanitarium building in the Hudson Valley. Finally, when my
father was nearly 80 years old, the insurance premiums became too
expensive, and he had to give up his state license. The day of Sam's
transfer was one of the saddest days that I remember in our
household.
The LSD experiments on the decisionally impaired were specula-
tive and perhaps risky, but there was nothing abstract about Sam's
illness or the suffering it caused him and his family. Surely medical
research with persons who are decisionally impaired must continue.
How it is to be done, without undermining the very humanity it seeks
to promote, will always entail an exquisitely delicate balance. That is
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truly the "key note" that must be struck in efforts to guide research on
this population.
